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WHO IS ADVISING OUR CHILDREN: CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION OF JUVENILES IN FLORIDA
ELIZABETH J. MAYKUT
I. INTRODUCTION
A thirteen-year-old boy called "Man" was arrested last year for
the armed robbery of a storage warehouse in Broward County.'
This was not Man's first visit to the warehouse. 2 He and "a buddy"
hit the same warehouse a month earlier. 3 Man had been released from
a three-week stay in a juvenile detention center four days before the
last warehouse incident.' Two days after his release, he was picked up
for possession of a stolen motorcycle, but was not recommitted be-
cause the crime was not violent enough.'
After being arrested for the warehouse robbery, Man was trans-
ported to the police station for questioning, where the police discov-
ered that his record showed thirty-five other criminal charges.6 Before
the officers began questioning, Man was told he had the right to re-
main silent; that anything he said could and would be used against
him in court; that he had the right to talk to a lawyer, to have a law-
yer with him during questioning, and to have a lawyer appointed if he
could not afford one.
Does this troubled youth who has probably heard this same rendi-
tion thirty-five times before need any more protection before the po-
lice begin asking him if he indeed committed the warehouse robbery?
Or, is Man the type of kid who lives to brag about his escapades, who
would most likely confess regardless of the type of protection af-
forded him? How much coercion is inherent in this setting? Would it
help Man to have his parents present?'
1. Kevin Davis, "Man" Arrested in Robbery Case, Boy Has Long Criminal Record, SUN
SENTINEL (Florida), Sept. 19, 1993, at lB.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. This statement embodies the traditional Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). See infra part Ill. Mr. Davis' article in the Sun Sentinel does not mention the reading
of the rights, but this author assumes it occurred.
8. Man eventually confessed to the robbery. Davis, supra note 1.
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Briana, a seventeen-year-old high school student, was arrested
along with three other teens late one Saturday night on drug-related
charges. 9 Police found her sitting in a car outside an apartment com-
plex while one of her friends made a drug deal with an undercover
officer inside. If asked, Briana would tell you she went to a party that
night with friends from school. One of them brought along a guy she
didn't know. When they all left the party to get some more beer, they
stopped off at this apartment. After Briana's arrest, the police find
that she has no record. She has never been to the police station be-
fore.
Before being questioned, Briana was also informed of her constitu-
tional right to remain silent and her right to an attorney. Should the
police be required to provide Briana with a lawyer before they talk to
her? Should her parents be notified or should she be allowed to call
any adult she trusts? Should the answers to any of these questions
depend on Briana's age or the fact that her record is clean? Is the
coercion in this situation increased or decreased because Briana has
never been to the police station before? This Comment attempts to
answer these questions.
The question of whether juveniles truly understand the conse-
quences of waiving their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
receive the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation has
been asked many times over; 0 however, it is a question that has never
before been so pressing. Juveniles are now responsible for twenty-six
percent of the nation's robberies, fourteen percent of all murders, and
9. This story is fictional and generally simulates the circumstances and possible issues in-
volved in these situations.
10. Many have written on the subject of what standard should be used in evaluating a ju-
venile's waiver of constitutional rights and whether it is possible for a juvenile to make a know-
ing and intelligent waiver. See Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of
Children's Constitutional Rights: Implications for the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 199 (1992); Larry E. Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting: A Child's Right to
Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMtNOLOGY 534 (1987); Mary A. Crossley, Note, Miranda and the
State Constitution: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693 (1986); Barry C. Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141
(1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing]; Christopher K. Vogel, Custodial Interrogation of Ju-
veniles in the United States and Florida, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157 (1981); Martin Levy &
Stephen Skacevic, What Standard Should be Used to Determine a Valid Juvenile Waiver?, 6
PEPP. L. REV. 767 (1979); Anthony J. Krastek, Comment, The Judicial Response to Juvenile
Confessions: An Examination of the Per Se Rule, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 659 (1978-79); Elaine W.
Shoben, Comment, The Interrogated Juvenile: Caveat Confessor?, 24 HAsTINs L.J. 413 (1973);
Charles H. Saylor, Comment, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77
DICK. L. REv. 543, 550 (1972-73); Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1149
(1968).
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forty-four percent of car thefts.II They also commit one-third of the
country's burglaries and sixteen percent of all rapes.12 In Florida, over
twelve percent of all arrests made between 1984 and 1992 involved a
juvenile. 13 In 1992, 87,000 children were processed through Florida's
juvenile justice system.14 In Broward County alone, arrests of juven-
iles eighteen years old and under have increased eighty percent in the
past ten years.' 5 The statistics linking juveniles with guns are even
more alarming. Children currently account for one in five weapons
arrests; in 1985, they accounted for only one in ten. 6 Last year, 2,515
Florida juveniles were arrested for possessing a gun when committing
a crime. 17
These ever increasing incidents of juvenile crime have prompted a
public outcry for a juvenile justice system that focuses on punishment,
rather than rehabilitation. 8 Whether Florida's juvenile justice system
should be reformed in this manner is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. Nevertheless, the first step toward any revision of the system
must begin with ensuring that juveniles' constitutional rights are not
ignored. The immaturity of youth requires that their rights be even
more closely guarded than those of adults. The juvenile justice system
can work effectively only if juvenile's constitutional rights are re-
spected. Children are getting the message that the system does not
care for them and in return, they do not care for the system. 19 If we
want children to respect society's values, we must respect them, which
includes protecting their constitutional rights.
In attempting to address the issues identified above, this Comment
will review the framework under which the nation's juvenile system
has operated during the last century and provide a brief overview of
the Supreme Court's Miranda decision. It will then delve into the ap-
plication of Miranda in the juvenile context, reviewing both Florida
law and the laws of other states in an attempt to evaluate Florida's
11. Warren Richey, Some Juvenile Crimes Down, but Trends Point Up, SUN SENTINEL
(Florida), Oct. 18, 1993, at IA (citing the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports released in 1993).
12. Id.
13. COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, ANNUAL REPORT 62 (Oct. 27,
1993) (on file with Comm'n).
14. Id. at 63.
15. Davis, supra note I.
16. Linda Kleindienst & Diane Hirth, Special Session"s Main Aim: Kid Crime, Chiles Wants
Sights Locked on Gun Issue, SUN SENTINEL (Florida), Oct. 31, 1993, at IA.
17. Id.
18. Id. One of the bills proposed during the November 1993 Special Session was dubbed the
"High Noon Act of 1994" because of the degree to which it proposed to toughen juvenile pun-
ishment.
19. Linda Kleindienst & Diane Hirth, Youth Violence on Rise, Kids Joke About Justice
System, SUN SENTINEL (Florida), Oct. 17, 1993, at IA.
1994]
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current treatment of juveniles. Lastly, this Comment will conclude by
recommending that Florida provide juveniles in a custodial interroga-
tion setting with greater protection than that afforded to adults in the
same setting.
II. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS PHILOSOPHY
At common law, children under seven were believed incapable of
possessing criminal intent.20 Beyond age seven, however, juvenile of-
fenders were subjected to the same arrest, trial, and punishment pro-
cedures as adults and were accorded the same procedural
protections. 21 In the late 1800s, however, reformers became appalled
that children were adjudicated by adult procedures and received long
prison sentences served with hardened criminals. 22 The reformers re-
solved to redesign America's juvenile justice system based on social
welfare philosophy. 23
Social welfare philosophy dictated that the state ask not "whether
the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent,' but 'What is he, how has he be-
come what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from a downward career[?]' ' 24 Under
this framework, the juvenile court did not face issues of "criminal
culpability, determinations of guilt or innocence, and punishment, but
... instead sensitivity, understanding, guidance, and protection." 25
The juvenile justice system was designed to make the child feel not
that he was under arrest or on trial, but that he was being cared for. 26
Thus, the rigidities of criminal procedure were discarded. 27 In a system
that focused on rehabilitation, that used clinical rather than punitive
procedures, it was assumed that proceedings should be non-adversar-
ial.28
The reformers fashioned a system where juvenile officials took on
the role of the child's parent, known as parens patriae, rather than
prosecutor and judge. 29 This was justified by the idea that a child has
20. JULIAN MACK, THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 310 (1925).
21. Id.
22. InreGault, 387 U.S. 1, 15(1967).
23. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
24. Gault, 387 U.S at 15 (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,
119-20 (1909)).
25. Holtz, supra note 10, at 535 (citing Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adver-
sary System: Problems of Function and Form, Wisc. L. REV. 7 (1965)).
26. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 16; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); see also Handler, supra note
25.
29. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55.
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a right not to liberty, as an adult has, but to custody.30 Thus, if a
child's parents were negligent in their duty and the child became delin-
quent, the state should step in and provide the custody to which the
child was entitled.31 According to reformers, in taking on this role, the
state did not deprive the child of any rights because he possessed
none.3 2 On this basis, juvenile proceedings were classified as civil, not
criminal, and accordingly, the state was not bound to afford a juve-
nile the same protections it did when it deprived an adult of his or her
liberty.33
Society's attitude and opinion on the juvenile justice system, how-
ever, have changed dramatically since its reform in the late nineteenth
century. Now, most people believe that children commit a dispropor-
tionate percentage of crimes, that children have become more mature
and more violent, and that children in the juvenile justice system are
not really punished.14 This attitude is exemplified by Florida Attorney
General Bob Butterworth's statement to two committees of the Flor-
ida House of Representatives: "When it comes to juvenile justice, we
are using a 'Leave it to Beaver' approach for 'Terminator'-type crimi-
nals." 35 Perhaps reflecting the changing views of society, in the past
thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has afforded juveniles
many of the procedural protections previously denied them.
In the landmark decision of In re Gault,36 the Supreme Court dra-
matically changed the character of the juvenile justice system. The
Court held that a child in an adjudicatory stage of a delinquency pro-
ceeding is entitled to the constitutional protections of assistance of
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.3 7 Gault mandated
the right to counsel because "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether
the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of
his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecu-
tion." 8 The Court emphasized the role of counsel in the juvenile jus-
30. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. This situation caused Judge Abe Fortas to remark: "There is evidence . . . that...
the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections a corded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent, 383
U.S. at 556 (citations omitted).
34. Dale, supra note 10.
35. Attorney General Bob Butterworth, Address at the Joint Meeting of the House Com-
mittees on Education & Criminal Justice (Feb. 8, 1993) (transcript available in the Attorney
General's office).
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 36.
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tice system: "The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, [and] to insist
upon regularity of the proceedings .... The child 'requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."' 3 9
Later, in Fare v. Michael C.,40 the Court reiterated the crucial role
of counsel in the juvenile justice process, but refused to give juveniles
greater procedural protections than those extended to adults:
[Tihe lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system.
Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is
the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of
the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the
courts.4
In three other landmark decisions, the Court also ruled against ex-
tending to juveniles constitutional rights currently afforded to
adults.4 2
III. MIRANDA: THE BASIC CONCEPT
In Miranda v. Arizona,43 the Supreme Court held that the State may
not use an accused's statements made during custodial interrogation
against him or her unless, before being questioned, the accused was
made aware of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. Thus, the
Court mandated that specific warnings be read to each accused prior
to being questioned.44 The police must inform the accused that he or
she: (1) "has the right to remain silent"; 43 (2) has "the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him [or her] during interro-
gation."; 41 (3) has the right to have a lawyer appointed if he or she is
indigent; 47 and (4) that anything revealed "can and will be used
39. Id. (footnotes omitted).
40. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
41. Id. at 719.
42. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (juveniles need not be given the option
of a jury trial in delinquency proceedings); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (although
preventive detention of adults has been held unconstitutional, it is constitutionally acceptable as
applied to juveniles); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (warrantless search of juvenile's
purse by school officials in a school setting without probable cause held constitutionally accepta-
ble because juvenile rather than adult was involved).
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 468.
46. Id. at 469.
47. Id. at 471.
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against the individual in court." '48 After receiving these warnings, if
the accused "indicates in any manner" that he or she wants to remain
silent, the accused has invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, and
interrogation must cease. 49 According to the Court, "any statement
taken after the person invokes his [or her] privilege cannot be other
than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." 50 Lastly, if the
accused asks for an attorney, interrogation must cease until he or she
has consulted with one. 5' Consulting with an attorney is viewed as a
protective device that "dispel[s] the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings '5 2 and allows the attorney to ensure that any statements
given are accurately preserved for presentation to the court.5 3
"[Sitatements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in
violation of these rules may not be admitted against the accused, at
least during the State's case in chief.' 5 4
Although Miranda's requirements are rigid, its virtues are thought
to outweigh its defects, in that it "inform[s] police and prosecutors
with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial inter-
rogation, and [informs] courts under what circumstances statements
obtained during such interrogation are not admissible." 55
If the State wants to use an accused's statement given after being
apprised of the Miranda rights and without the advice of counsel, it
must "demonstrate [by a preponderance of the evidence] that the de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. 5 6 Thus,
the determination whether statements made during custodial interro-
gation are admissible should be "made upon an inquiry into the total-
ity of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain
whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to
forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of coun-
sel." 57
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 474.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 458.
53. Id. at 470.
54. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
479 (1966) and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971)).
55. Id.
56. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (the voluntariness
of a defendant's statement must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence).
57. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-77).
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IV. MIRANDA RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO JUVENILES
In 1948, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of a juvenile's
due process rights in Haley v. Ohio. 58 In Haley, a fifteen-year-old boy,
who was questioned by five or six police officers for five hours
throughout the night, admitted to a crime without being advised of his
constitutional rights and signed a written confession without the pres-
ence of a parent or attorney.5 9 The Supreme Court held that the con-
fession was obtained in violation of the boy's Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights6 and strongly stated its belief that special care
should be used in evaluating the voluntariness of a juvenile's confes-
sion:
And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age
15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be
judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which
would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great
instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old
lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a
ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly might stand the
ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe that a lad of
tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs
counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear,
then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the
overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush
him. 6'
The Court did not attempt to formulate a procedure that should be
used with all juveniles in custodial interrogation settings. Indeed, in
his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated that there was no
mathematical formula that may be used in determining whether a con-
fession was voluntary. 62 He stated that whether a child's confession
was voluntary "invites psychological judgment-a psychological judg-
ment that reflects deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society." 63
In 1962, the Court decided Gallegos v. Colorado, 64 which also in-
volved a juvenile's confession to a crime without the presence of a
58. 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (5-4 decision). Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Burton, Reed, and
Jackson dissented in Haley.
59. Id. at 598.
60. Id. at 599.
61. Id. at 599-600.
62. Id. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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lawyer or other adult advisor. In Gallegos, a fourteen-year-old boy
was held incommunicado for five days, after which he signed a formal
confession.65 The Supreme Court held that, based on the totality of
the circumstances, the confession was obtained in violation of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights." It stated:
But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to
have any conception of what will confront him when he is made
accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person
who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the
consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who
is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights.
He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses
and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would
have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession
were without advice as to his rights-from someone concerned with
securing him those rights-and without the aid of more mature
judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which
he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have
given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could
not.
67
Despite the Court's tough language, its holding that this confession
violated due process was not based solely on the defendant's youth:
"There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except the
totality of circumstances ... ."68 Here, the Court was convinced that
the combination of several factors, including the age of the defendant,
the long period during which he was detained, that his parents were
not notified, that he was not promptly brought before the juvenile
judge, plus the absence of advice from a lawyer or other advisor, con-
stituted a violation of due process. 69
The Supreme Court's first opportunity after Miranda to address the
juvenile's right to remain silent came in 1979. In Fare v. Michael C. ,10
a sixteen-year-old boy asked to see his probation officer after being
fully advised of his Miranda rights.71 After the police denied his re-
65. Id. at 50.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 55.
69. Id.
70. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
71. Id. at 710.
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quest, the juvenile made statements and drew sketches implicating
himself in a murder. 7 Later, he moved to suppress the statements and
sketches on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated be-
cause his request to see his probation officer was an invocation of his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent just as if he had requested the
assistance of an attorney."
The California Supreme Court agreed that Michael's request for his
probation officer was a per se invocation of his privilege against self-
incrimination just as if it were a request for an attorney. 74 It based its
decision on People v. Burton," where it had held that a juvenile's re-
quest to see his parents during custodial interrogation was an invoca-
tion of his Fifth Amendment rights. Because it found that the
probation officer was "a trusted guardian figure who exercises the au-
thority of the state as parens patriae," the court held that the minor's
request was the same as a request for his parents, which constituted an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.76 As the court held that
Michael's request for his probation officer was an exercise of his Fifth
Amendment privilege, it refused to evaluate considerations of capac-
ity, coercion, or voluntariness. 7
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Michael's request to see
his probation officer did not invoke either his right to remain silent or
his right to counsel.78 It emphasized that the rule in Miranda was
based on a perception that a lawyer has a unique ability, not possessed
by a probation officer, to protect an accused's Fifth Amendment
rights. 79 The Court further found that the probation officer was not
able to offer independent advice such as that that could be given by an
attorney because, as an employee of the State, he had a conflict of
interest based on his obligation to both the State and the juvenile.80
The Court reiterated its Miranda rule that the government could not
use a juvenile's statement obtained during custodial interrogation un-
less it demonstrated that the youth "knowingly and intelligently"
waived his rights.8' In evaluating a waiver, the totality of the circum-
stances should be considered:
72. Id. at 711.
73. Id. at 711-12.
74. Id. at 709.
75. 491 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1971).
76. In re Michael C., 579 P.2d 7, 10 (Cal. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707 (1979).
77. Id. at 10-11.
78. Fare, 442 U.S. at 728.
79. ld. at 719-20.
80. Id. at 720-21.
81. Id. at 724 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
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We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required
where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as
opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach
permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the
juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,
and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings
given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights.
... At the same time, that approach refrains from imposing rigid
restraints on police and courts in dealing with an experienced older
juvenile with an extensive prior record who knowingly and
intelligently waives his Fifth Amendment rights and voluntarily
consents to interrogation.12
Four justices dissented in Fare. Justice Marshall, with whom
Justices Brennan and Stevens joined, stated that "the coerciveness of
the custodial setting is of heightened concern where, as here, a juve-
nile is under investigation."83 Justice Powell would have affirmed be-
cause he did not believe that Michael, whom he saw as "immature,
emotional and uneducated,"4 received a "fair interrogation free from
inherently coercive circumstances." 5
A. Totality of the Circumstances v. the Per Se Approach
Most state courts continue to apply the totality of the circumstances
test enunciated in Fare in evaluating a juvenile's waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights.16 Although courts have identified and applied ad-
ditional factors other than those listed by the Supreme Court, they
have generally declined to give controlling weight to any one particu-
lar factor. Some commentators believe this tends to give the trial court
almost unfettered discretion.17 Applying the test in this manner also
makes it practically impossible for police to determine whether a ju-
venile's waiver will be admissible at trial.88
82. Id. at 725-26.
83. Id. at 729 (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962)). For a discussion of Haley, see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text; for a
discussion of Gallegos, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
84. Fare, 442 U.S. at 733.
85. Id. at 734.
86. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: Fulfilling Gault's Promise,
CEN R FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH PoLICY MANUAL 8 (1989); Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 10;
Christopher K. Vogel, Comment, Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in the United States and
Florida, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 165 (1981); see, e.g., In re M.A., 310 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.
1981); In re S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1979).
87. Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 10, at 169-90.
88. Id.
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The other option for evaluating juvenile waiver is commonly re-
ferred to as the per se approach. The per se approach excludes any
waiver or confession made by a juvenile without adherence to the req-
uisite procedural safeguards. As previously discussed, the Supreme
Court has flatly refused to adopt a per se rule for evaluating the vol-
untariness of a juvenile's confession, 89 although it has repeatedly rec-
ognized the need for taking great care in accomplishing this task.
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an
admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure
that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was
not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. 9°
B. Florida Law
In Florida, an accused is protected by the Florida Constitution as
well as the United States Constitution. Article I, section 9 of the Flor-
ida Constitution protects an accused from conviction based upon a
coerced confession.9' Thus, before introducing a defendant's state-
ment at trial, the state must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the statement was voluntarily made.92
The Florida Constitution also specifically provides for a separate
juvenile justice system, if authorized by law, which need not include a
jury or "other requirements applicable to criminal cases." 93 Florida's
juvenile justice system is outlined in chapter 39, Florida Statutes,
"Proceedings Related to Juveniles." Under this Act and the Constitu-
tion, a juvenile who elects to be classified a delinquent and tried in the
89. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (absence of parent or other interested adult at
juvenile's waiver of privilege against self-incrimination was not a per se invalidation of waiver
and subsequent confession); see supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
90. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
91. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a
witness against himself." FLA. COrNST. art. I, § 9.
92. Balthazar v. State, 549 So. 2d 661, 662 (Fla. 1989); DeConingh v. State, 433 So. 2d 501,
503 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Brewer v. State, 386 So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla.
1980); Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1974); McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553, 554
(Fla. 1973), overruled by Antone v. State, 382 So. 2d 1205 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 913
(1980).
93. "When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be charged with a violation of
law as an act of delinquency instead of crime and tried without a jury or other requirements
applicable to criminal cases." FLA. CONST. art. I. § 15(b). The Conslitution also gives juveniles
the option to be tried as an adult: "Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as provided
by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in an appropriate court as an adult." Id.
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juvenile system is completely removed from the criminal system. Once
classified delinquent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services is responsible for providing the juvenile with assistance 4
Although Florida's Constitution and laws allow the state to provide
juveniles with less protection than adults, Florida courts have shown a
strong desire to protect the state's children.9s Infants have been treated
as wards of the court, and the courts have been charged with a duty
and obligation to preserve and protect them.9 Waiver has not been
allowed in circumstances that could hardly compare to the ramifica-
tions of a juvenile's waiver of constitutional rights.97 The Florida Su-
preme Court has categorized the well-being of children as a subject
that is within the "state's constitutional power to regulate."9' The
Florida Legislature also affords juveniles specific privileges and pro-
tections based solely on age.99
94. FLA. SeAT. § 39.041(l) (1993).
95. This is also evident from the purposes of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, codified at
section 39.001, Florida Statutes. Specifically, with regard to juvenile delinquency, the Act states:
"The purposes of this chapter are: (a) Itlo protect society more effectively by substituting for
retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative
restitution, recognizing that the application of sanctions which are consistent with the serious-
ness of the offense is appropriate in all cases." FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(a) (1991).
96. Cornelius v. Sunset Golf Course, 423 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (citing
Turner v. Andrews, 196 So. 449 (Fla. 1940)).
97. Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24, 25-26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (neither a minor nor his
father could waive the minor's right to file a compulsory counterclaim in an automobile negli-
gence personal injury case filed against him), overruled by Venus Labs., Inc. v. Katz, 573 So. 2d
993 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
98. Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1981) (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968)).
99. The Florida Statutes provide that a minor, defined as anyone under the age of 18, FLA.
STAT. §§ 1.01, 743.07 & 847.001(4) (1993), cannot do the following:
a. Make a will. Id. § 732.501.
b. Buy cigarettes or other tobacco products. Id. § 859.06.
c. Watch, buy or rent "harmful" (explicit) videos. Id. § 847.013.
d. Place a wager at a horse race. Id. § 550.0425.
e. Visit dance halls. Id. § 562.48.
f. Register to vote. Id. § 97.041.
g. Serve on a jury. Id. § 40.01.
The Florida Statutes also place the following age limitations upon children under a specific
age:
a. Under 17, cannot donate blood. Id. § 743.06.
b. Under 16, cannot consent to sex. Id. § 800.04.
c. Under 16, cannot use BB or similar type gun without adult supervision. Id. §
790.22.
d. Under 13, cannot give consent to confinement to negate kidnapping charge with-
out consent of parent. Id. § 787.01.
e. Under 14, cannot be employed, with certain exceptions. Id. § 450.021(3).
f. Under 21, cannot possess alcohol. Id. § 562.111. It is also unlawful to sell, give or
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According to Florida law, "[a] juvenile may waive his rights under
Miranda, but the state bears a heavy burden in establishing that the
waiver was intelligently made.''00 Florida courts have repeatedly re-
fused to hold a confession involuntary simply because it was made by
a juvenile.' 0' In refusing to adopt a rule that would exclude all confes-
sions made by a defendant under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
the Florida Supreme Court stated:
We feel, too, that "self-confessed criminals should be punished, not
liberated on the basis of dubious technicalities" even though they
may be young. Untenable exclusionary rules of evidence do not
promote the solving of transgressions against the welfare of society
and the apprehension of those responsible therefor, which too often
constitute a miscarriage of justice. 02
In determining the admissibility of a juvenile's statement, Florida
courts examine the totality of the circumstances under which it was
made.0 1 In applying the totality test, courts follow the general rule set
forth in People v. Lara:1°4
[A] minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even of
capital offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other
responsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession depends
not on his age alone but on a combination of that factor with such
other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experience, and
ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement. 05
serve alcoholic beverages to anyone under 21. Id. § 562.11(1).
g. Under 16, cannot obtain drivers' license, Id. § 322.05.
h. Between ages 6-16 must attend school. Id. § 232.01(1)(a).
i. Under 17, cannot be employed where alcohol is served. Id. § 450.021(4).
100. T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (citing Arnold v. State, 265 So.
2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), cert. denied, 272 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973)). The proper standard for
demonstrating the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver of the Miranda rights is preponderance
of the evidence. Balthazar v. State, 549 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1989) (defendant's allegation of a limited
understanding of English does not change the standard from preponderance of the evidence to
clear and convincing); see also Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 1980) ("State met its
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that [the seventeen-year-old's] con-
fession was freely and voluntarily given and. that [he] knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel.").
101. T.B., 306 So. 2d at 185; State v. Francois, 197 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 1967) ("[Tbo rule
out all statements merely because of the youth of the maker, would unduly restrict law enforce-
ment" (quoting People v. Magee, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 925 (1964)),
cert, denied, 390 U.S. 982 (1968).
102. Francois, 197 So. 2d at 495.
103. T.B., 306 So. 2d at 185 (citing Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)).
104. 432 P.2d 202, 215 (Cal. 1967), cerf. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968).
105. Id. at 215.
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The Florida Supreme Court also considers age but one factor among
many to be considered in evaluating a juvenile's statement: "[T]he age
of the person should be considered, but to rule out all statements
merely because of the youth of the maker, would unduly restrict law
enforcement." '0
A survey of Florida cases evaluating confessions by juveniles reveals
that Florida courts overwhelmingly find that a juvenile's statement
obtained after a waiver of Miranda rights was freely and voluntarily
made 0 7 Even in cases where the juvenile was relatively young, the
courts generally admit his or her statement.
In Postell v. State, °'0 the Third District Court of Appeal held that
substantial, competent evidence supported the trial court's finding
that Postell, a thirteen-year-old female, knowingly and intelligently
waived her right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. The
defendant argued that her videotaped confessions were wrongfully ad-
mitted because she did not understand her Miranda rights and there-
fore could not have intelligently waived them.'09 Although the court
did not discuss all the evidence considered by the trial court in finding
a knowing and intelligent waiver, it seemed convinced by a videotape
of the confession which showed that ten minutes were spent discussing
the defendant's rights, after which she gave an "uninterrupted narra-
tive of the crimes."" 0 Interestingly, the juvenile's mother was present
during the questioning; but the court disregarded this fact, despite the
defendant's contention that her mother's admonition to "tell the po-
lice everything" made her confession involuntary."'
106. Francois, 197 So. 2d at 495 (quoting People v. Magee, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963)).
107. Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 1980); Rimpel v. State, 607 So. 2d 502, 503
(Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (fifteen-year-old's confession to murder was voluntary, despite fact that
defendant was intermittently questioned for approximately nine hours), review denied, 614 So.
2d 503 (Fla. 1993); K.W. v. State, 600 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (statements were freely
and voluntarily given under the totality of the surrounding circumstances where child initiated
the phone call to the police); Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (confession by
sixteen-year-old after waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary); Zamot v. State, 375 So. 2d 881
(Fla. 3d DCA 1979). But see B.S. v. State, 548 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (confession of
juvenile at police station was improperly admitted because it was the product of a nonconsensual
confinement); M.L.H. v. State, 399 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Ist DCA 1981) (sixteen-year-old's confession
invalidated because waiver form was not signed by two witnesses as required by FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.290 and defendant was illiterate).
108. 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
109. Id. at 1160.
110. Id. at 1161 n.4.
111. Id. at 1160 n.2. This argument has been used before. In Anglin v. State, the fifteen-
year-old appellant argued that his confession was the product of undue threat or coercion be.
cause his mother told him at the time of his arrest to "tell the truth" or she "would clobber
him." 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Ist DCA 1972). The court held:
It may well be that an admonition by a parent to her teen-age son to tell the truth is
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Recently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld a trial court's
decision that a ten-year-old voluntarily waived his Miranda rights." 2
Notwithstanding, the court began its discussion by noting:
We have some difficulty with the proposition that a 10-year-old child
could ever understand, in the sense that a mature adult could, the
consequences of waiving his constitutional rights to silence and
counsel, and of giving a statement about the crimes charged against
him. However, we do not believe that we are free under the legal
standards of review to substitute our own conclusions for those of
the trial court, and we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the trial
court was wrong."
3
The court was so convinced by the trial court's "thorough and com-
prehensive" order that it reproduced it in its entirety.1' 4 The trial court
noted the following factors in finding that the child comprehended
and understood the Miranda warnings: (1) the warnings were given to
him several times in language a child could understand; (2) this was
the second time the juvenile had been arrested and read the warnings;
(3) the child had the ability to understand and comprehend the warn-
ings despite his relatively low IQ (70) and attendance at classes for the
learning disabled; (4) all procedures were explained to the child's
grandmother; and (5) there were no threats made against the child and
the conditions surrounding the child's statements were not coercive., 5
In his dissent, Judge Farmer began by saying:
Let us be clear about what the court does today. It holds that a 10
year old boy with an I.Q. of 69 or 70, who had been placed by
school authorities in a learning disability program and was described
by one of his teachers as having difficulty in understanding
directions, who had no prior record with the police, who was crying
upbringing of a child to be a useful citizen necessarily encompasses advice by a parent
for the child to be truthful. The motherly concern of this parent for her offspring and
at the same time her concern for the basic precepts of morality are to be commended.
We find no element of a threat or coercion on the part of this mother and hold that
the controverted confession was freely and voluntarily given by the appellant.
Id. at 752. See also Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1979) (sufficient evidence existed to
support trial court's decision that waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent and the
confession was voluntary where interrogation and confession took place in presence of appel-
lant's father), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980); Hallihan v. State, 226 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA
1969).
112. W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), review denied, 593 So. 2d 1054
(Fla. 1991).
113. Id. at 980.
114. Id. at 981-83.
115. Id. at 983,
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and upset when taken into custody, and who was then held by the
police for nearly 6 hours (some in a police car but mostly in the
station) without any nonaccusatorial adult present, could in the end
knowingly and voluntarily confess to nearly every unsolved burglary
on the police blotter. Because I am unable to square such a decision
with my constitutional obligations, I respectfully dissent.' 16
Judge Farmer emphasized that the totality of the circumstances test
mandated inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interro-
gation." 7 He stated that he was unable to find the confessions volun-
tary because, apart from the officers' testimony, there were no non-
subjective factors that favored a finding that it was voluntary. 18 In
closing, Judge Farmer advocated an age-related exclusionary rule:
"Even recognizing that there is no per se rule against juvenile confes-
sions, at the lowest end of the age spectrum there must be some ages
where no confession will ever be admissible." '" 9
Despite their overwhelming opposition to an exclusionary rule,
Florida courts have applied a per se rule to juvenile confessions when
presented in the context of a parental notification statute originally
passed by the Florida Legislature in 1951120 and frequently
amended.121 In Roberts v. State, 22 the Florida Supreme Court con-
strued a predecessor of this statute, which read:
The person taking and retaining a child in custody shall notify the
parents or legal custodians of the child and the principal of the
school in which said child is enrolled at the earliest practicable time,
and shall, without delay for the purpose of investigation or any other
purpose, deliver the child, by the most direct practicable route, to the
court of the county or district where the child is taken into
custody. 12
116. Id.
117. Id. at 984-85.
118. Id. at 984.
119. Id. at 985.
120. Ch. 26880, § 1, Fla. Laws (1951).
121. Section 39.037(2) currently provides:
When a child is taken into custody as provided in this section, the person taking the
child into custody shall attempt to notify the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of
the child. The person taking the child into custody shall continue such attempt until
the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child is notified or the child is delivered
to an intake counselor ....
FLA. STAT. § 39.037(2) (1993). This provision was originally codified at section 39.03 and has
been amended at least 18 times since originally enacted. Significant revisions were made between
1971 and 1973. Ch. 71-130, § 2, 1971 Fla. Laws 335, 337; Ch. 71-355, § 10, 1971 Fla. Laws 1593,
1597; Ch. 73-231, §§ 4-9, 1973 Fla. Laws 518, 525-29.
122. 285 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
123. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3) (1971).
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Describing the statutory language as explicit and mandatory, the court
held the sixteen-year-old defendant's confession, obtained after he
was advised of his Miranda rights, inadmissible because the state had
not complied with this statute. 124
Following Roberts, the First District Court of Appeal construed an
amended version of section 39.03(3)(a) 121 to require that a juvenile's
parents be notified immediately after the youth is taken into custody
and before he or she is questioned.126 In Dowst v. State, a sixteen-
year-old defendant asked before he was questioned if he could call his
parents, but was not permitted to do so until after he had given state-
ments to the police. 127 Taking the Roberts holding a step further, the
First District held not only that this amounted to a statutory violation,
but that the defendant's request to speak to his parents "constituted a
continuous assertion of his privilege against self incrimination and
that any confession given by him before either (1) he [was] granted the
right to make such call, or (2) the officer [made] a good faith effort to
so advise his parents, [was) inadmissible in evidence." 2s
The Florida Supreme Court next visited the issue of the require-
ments imposed by section 39.03 in Doerr v. State. 29 In deciding that
notification of a child's parents was not a statutory prerequisite to
interrogation, the court emphasized that the statute now required that
the child's parents be notified "only after it is determined that the
child will be detained or placed in shelter care." 130 It distinguished this
case from its earlier holding in Roberts by pointing to the deletion
from the statute of language that required that the child be delivered
"without delay for the purpose of investigation or any other purpose
... to the court of the county or district where the child is taken into
custody.""' The court stated that the purpose of the notification was
simply to advise the child's parents of his whereabouts and not to
124. Roberts, 285 So. 2d at 385-86.
125. "If the person taking the child into custody determines, pursuant to paragraph (c), that
the child should be detained or placed in shelter care, he shall immediately notify the parents or
legal custodians of the child .... " FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(a) (1975).
126. Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. Ist DCA), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.
1976).
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also Sublette v. State, 365 So. 2d 775, 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ("Where an
officer who arrests a child fails to comply with this procedure [(notification of parent)], particu-
larly, as in this case, after being specifically requested to do so, and interrogates a child, any
statements obtained from him are inadmissible."), review dismissed, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1979).
129. 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1980).
130. Id. at 907.
131. Id.
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"prohibit interrogation after the child is taken into custody but before
a determination is made to release or detain.'
3 2
Justice Adkins wrote a dissenting opinion in Doerr, with which
Justices Boyd and Sundberg concurred. He stated that the parental
notification was not only to let the parents know the location of their
child, but to "assure the voluntary nature of any confession made by
the juvenile." '3 He pointed to the change in the statutory language
that required any person taking the child into custody to "immedi-
ately notify the parents or legal custodians,"'3 4 and interpreted this as
"a legislative directive to the courts and other law enforcement agen-
cies that juveniles shall be treated differently from other suspected
criminals in that they shall not be interrogated until the parents or
legal custodian shall be notified."' 35 He expressed his doubt in a ju-
venile's ability to understand the Miranda rights by stating: "In many
instances Miranda warnings would mean nothing to the juvenile de-
fendant."1 3 6
In the most recent decision construing this section, State v. Paille,
13 7
the Second District Court of Appeal followed Doerr in holding that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, a seventeen-year-old know-
ingly and intelligently waived his rights and voluntarily gave a confes-
sion despite the absence of his mother.' The court emphasized that
the defendant had told the officer that he did not want his mother to
be contacted and concluded by stating: "Given that he was an 'old'
juvenile and that he requested his mother not be notified, his age and
her absence are insufficient to establish that the statement was invol-
untary. "'1 In following the Doerr decision, however, the Second Dis-
trict completely overlooked the broadening of the statutory language
that had occurred since 19g0. The statute now requires that a juven-
ile's parents be notified anytime he or she is taken into custody. 140
132. Id.
133. Id. at 908.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 908-09.
136. Id. at 909.
137. 601 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
138. Id. at 1324-25.
139. Id.
140. When a child is taken into custody as provided in this section, the person taking
the child into custody shall attempt to notify the parent, guardian, or legal custodian
of the child. The person taking the child into custody shall continue such attempt until
the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child is notified or the child is delivered
to an intake counselor pursuant to s. 39.047, whichever occurs first. If the child is
delivered to an intake counselor before the parent, guardian, or legal custodian is
notified, the intake counselor or case manager shall continue the attempt to notify
until the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child is notified.
FLA. STAT. § 39.037(2) (1993).
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C. The States Get Creative: Adoption of Per Se Exclusionary Rules
The uncertainty of the totality of the circumstances test and the re-
suits of two studies concluding that many juveniles do not have the
ability to knowingly and intelligently waive their Fifth Amendment
rights 41 have led some states to require that juveniles receive addi-
tional protections not available to adults in a custodial interrogation
setting. A number of states have adopted per se exclusionary rules ei-
ther judicially or legislatively. As previously mentioned, the per se ap-
proach excludes any waiver or confession made by a juvenile without
adherence to the requisite procedural safeguards.
1. Adoption by the Courts
In formulating a rule that gives juveniles greater protection than
adults, states must carefully consider the basis for the rule. According
to the United States Supreme Court: "[A] State may not impose...
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this
Court specifically refrains from imposing them." 14 California con-
fronted this doctrine in Fare v. Michael C.'4 1 when the United States
Supreme Court struck down the holding that a minor's request for his
probation officer was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. '4
However, "[e]ach state has power to impose higher standards govern-
ing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal
Constitution. "4 Thus, states may require greater protection of juven-
iles' rights in a custodial interrogation setting based either on its state
constitution or its power to govern police practices.
States have taken interesting and varying approaches in formulating
exclusionary rules for juvenile waiver. Many have adopted some ver-
sion of what has been termed "the interested adult rule." At least one
has designed a simplified form for use by police officers dealing with
juveniles, and some have created a separate rule for juveniles based on
age, with older juveniles receiving less protection than their younger
counterparts.
Indiana appears to be the first state to require that a juvenile's
waiver of his or her Fifth Amendment rights be excluded unless the
juvenile was given the opportunity to consult a parent or another
141. See infra notes 174-202 and accompanying text.
142. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
143. In re Michael C., 579 P.2d 7, 10 (Cal. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707 (1979).
144. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
145. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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adult. In Lewis v. State,t4 the Indiana Supreme Court held that a ju-
venile's statement or confession could not be used against him or her
unless he or she and his or her parents were informed of the right to
counsel and to remain silent. Under Indiana's rule, a juvenile may
then waive his or her rights if there are "no elements of coercion,
force or inducement present" and the youth has been given an oppor-
tunity to consult with "his parents, guardian or an attorney represent-
ing the juvenile."' 47
In formulating its rule, the court in Lewis questioned whether a mi-
nor has the capacity to waive constitutional rights.
[Tihe juvenile is perhaps in the most serious predicament of his short
life....
Many times he faces his accusers alone and without benefit of
either parent or counsel. It is in these circumstances that children
under eighteen are required to decide whether they wish to give up
the intricate, important and long established fifth and sixth
amendment rights. It indeed seems questionable whether any child
falling under the legally defined age of a juvenile and confronted in
such a setting can be said to be able to voluntarily, and willingly
waive those most important rights.
4t
In justifying the need to treat juveniles and adults differently, the
court further stated:
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an
accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate
and protected status in our legal system .... It would indeed be
inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the State deems
incapable of being able to marry, [or] purchase alcoholic beverages
... should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult
when asked to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at
a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and
unfamiliar.1"9
Indiana's rule was eventually superseded by statute.5 0
146. 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ind. 1972).
147. Id. The court did not specifically state whether this rule was based upon the Indiana
state constitution, the federal constitution, the state's common law, or something else.
148. Id. at 141.
149. Id. at 141-42.
150. Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 218 (1992).
Indiana law provides that a child's constitutional rights or rights guaranteed any other law may
be waived only (1) by the child's counsel with the child's consent; (2) by the child's parent or
guardian as long as that person has no interest adverse to the child and has consulted with the
child, and both the child and parent or guardian's waiver is knowing and voluntary. IND. CODE §
31-6-7-3(a) (1982). A child also has the ability to waive his or her right to consultation. Id. § 31-
6-7-3(b).
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Following in Indiana's steps, Louisiana rejected the totality of the
circumstances test and adopted a per se exclusionary rule in 1978.
Louisiana's rule is specifically based on its state constitution. In In re
Dino,5' the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Because most juveniles are not mature enough to understand their
rights and are not competent to exercise them, the concepts of
fundamental fairness embodied in the Declaration of Rights of our
[state] constitution require that juveniles not be permitted to waive
constitutional rights on their own.'5 2
In supporting its rule, the court quoted an appeals court judge who
stated: "I cannot fathom how a minor, who lacks the capacity to sell,
mortgage, donate or release (who could not even contract with the
lawyer whose services he waives) can be said to possess the capacity to
waive constitutional privileges and lose his freedom as a conse-
quence." ' '53 Under the court's rule, for a juvenile's waiver to be valid,
the State must establish that before waiving his or her rights, the juve-
nile consulted with an attorney or adult who was interested in the ju-
venile's welfare, and that any adult who was not an attorney was fully
advised of the rights of the juvenile. 5 4 The court did not specify an
age limit for this rule.
Vermont has adopted an almost identical rule based on its constitu-
tion. Vermont's rule varies only in that a juvenile must be given an
opportunity to consult with an adult, but is not specifically required
to consult with an adult before waiver.'5
Massachusetts has adopted a modified approach to juvenile waiver.
Instead of interpreting its state constitution to require the safeguards
it mandates, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts couches its
rule in the rubric of the "knowing and intelligent waiver." In Com-
monwealth v. A Juvenile,156 the court concluded that to demonstrate a
knowing and intelligent waiver by a juvenile, the Commonwealth
must show that "a parent or interested adult was present, understood
the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his rights to the ju-
venile so that the juvenile understands the significance of waiver of
these rights."'17 Even so, statements made by juveniles fourteen and
151. 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
152. Id. at 594 (footnotes omitted).
153. Id. at 594 n.25 (quoting In re Holifield, 319 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (Feder-
off, J., concurring)) (citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982).
156. 449 N.E.2d 654 (Mass. 1983).
157. Id. at 657.
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over without compliance with this rule may still be admitted if it can
be shown that "the circumstances ... demonstrate a high degree of
intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of
the juvenile."' 158
New Hampshire has implemented another innovative approach to
safeguard juveniles' procedural rights. In State v. Benoit,5 9 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court adopted a new twist on the traditional to-
tality of the circumstances test. It designed a "simplified juvenile
rights form" for use by police officers dealing with juveniles. 60 Al-
though the court did not require that a confession be excluded if the
simplified form was not used, it indicated that a court should presume
a nonsimplified explanation of rights to be inadequate. '6 '
2. Legislation
Quite a few state legislatures have passed per se exclusionary
rules. 16 2 In Connecticut, a child's confession is inadmissible in a pro-
ceeding for delinquency unless it was made in the presence of a parent
or guardian and when both parent and child have been advised of the
child's Miranda rights. 61 Oklahoma has a similar law, but it is not
limited to delinquency proceedings. 1'
Wisconsin has legislatively mandated that any child under the age
of fifteen who is alleged to be delinquent be represented at all stages
of the proceedings and not be allowed to waive that right. 6 A child
fifteen or over may waive the right to counsel if "the court is satisfied
such waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made and the court accepts
the waiver."' 16
Iowa law prohibits a child from waiving the right to be represented
by counsel at hearings associated with the delinquency process. 67 Yet
a child over sixteen may waive the right to counsel in a custodial inter-
rogation setting if a good faith effort has been made to notify the
child's parent, guardian, or custodian that the child has been taken
into custody and of the alleged delinquent act, the location of the
child, and the right of the parent to visit and confer with the child.'"
158. Id.
159. 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985).
160. Id. at 304. The form is appended to the opinion. Id. at 306.
161. Id.
162. The author did not attempt to survey all fifty states in compiling this Comment.
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-137(a) (1992).
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1109(a) (Supp. 1994).
165. WIs. STAT. § 48.23 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
166. Id.
167. IowA CODE § 232.11 (1993).
168. Id. § 232.11(2).
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Texas provides that a juvenile may waive the right to an attorney
only if "the waiver is made by the child and the attorney for the
child."' 69 This, however, is qualified by a rule that allows the admis-
sion of a child's written statement if the child received a Miranda-type
warning from a magistrate before making the statement. 70
Lastly, West Virginia's rule was formulated by both the legislature
and the courts. West Virginia's code prohibits the interrogation of a
juvenile without the presence of a parent or counsel. 7' In State ex. rel.
J.M. v. Taylor, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a juvenile
may only waive his or her right to counsel upon the advice of coun-
sel. 72 The Court felt this rule was necessary to ensure that the juven-
ile's waiver was knowing:
Juvenile waiver of constitutional rights obviously must be more
carefully proscribed than adult waiver because of the unrebuttable
presumption, long memorialized by courts and legislatures, that
juveniles lack the capacity to make legally binding decisions. No
juvenile legal status is treated the same as that of an adult, to our
knowledge. (13
D. Empirical Studies on Juveniles' Comprehension of the Miranda
Warning
Two studies have been undertaken to specifically evaluate juveniles'
capacity to waive their Miranda rights. Although neither were con-
ducted within the last decade, they still represent the most current
source available.
In 1969, a study was conducted with ninety juveniles to determine
whether the Miranda warning should be revised for the juvenile of-
fender and whether a minor has the capacity to knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his or her Miranda rights. 74 The subjects ranged in age
from thirteen to seventeen, but the majority were age fourteen, an age
the researchers focused on because, under California law, a child un-
der fourteen was presumed incompetent to commit a crime.' The re-
searchers used a simplified Miranda warning and a formal Miranda
169. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
170. Id. § 51.09(b).
171. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(d) (1991).
172. 276 S.E.2d 199, 204 (W. Va. 1981).
173. Id. at 203.
174. A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan C. Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L.
Rav. 39, 44 (1970).
175. Id.
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
warning and tested the subjects' understanding of each. 176 During in-
terviews with the subjects, the interviewers attempted to create "the
mentally distracting atmosphere of police field interrogation" to as-
sure accurate results. 77 The juveniles were scored on a scale of one to
ten for understanding, with each being eligible to receive two points
for each element of the Miranda warning (i.e. right to silence, use of
statement in court, right to attorney, right to attorney during ques-
tioning, and no cost for attorney if indigent). 7 1
Of the ninety juveniles interviewed, only five received a perfect
score of ten and eighty-six waived their right to silence. 79 Those who
had been adjudicated juvenile delinquents exhibited a greater under-
standing of the warning than did non-delinquents.8 0 Surprisingly, re-
sults indicated that the simplified warning was generally less
understood by the overall group than the formal warning. 8' Contrary
to the overall group, however, among non-delinquent fourteen-year-
olds, the simplified warning was better understood.8 Among the
group of fourteen-year-olds studied, the least understood element was
the right to have an attorney present during questioning while the
right to silence and general right to an attorney were the best under-
stood.'83
The researchers concluded that a small percentage of juveniles is
capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving their rights.'i 4 Based
on the low overall index of understanding among fourteen-year-olds,
and the failure of the simplified form to significantly increase under-
standing, the researchers concluded: "Perhaps 14-year-olds as a group
are not capable of knowingly and intelligently understanding their
rights."'
In a more extensive study, Thomas Grisso analyzed juveniles' com-
prehension of Miranda rights as compared to that of adults. 186 Grisso
broke the warning down into four elements, with each subject eligible
to receive two points of credit on every warning by demonstrating an
176. Id.
177. Id. at 42.
178. Id. at 43.
179. Id. at 44.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 48.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 50.
184. Id. at 54.
185. Id.
186. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
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adequate understanding of the element.'" The study found "striking
and consistent differences" between the juveniles' and adults' com-
prehension.'88 A perfect score of eight, representing adequate under-
standing, was achieved by only 20.9% of the juveniles, compared to
42.3% of the adults. 8 9 Amazingly, 55.3% of the juveniles, compared
to 23.1% of the adults manifested inadequate (zero-credit) under-
standing of at least one of the four warnings. 9' On their understand-
ing of six key words used in the Miranda warning, the highest possible
scores were attained by 60.1% of the adults, but by only 33.2% of the
juveniles. '9'
The study found a significant relationship between juveniles' scores
and their age, race, and IQ, but none between scores and the juven-
iles' sex, socioeconomic status (when controlled for IQ differences) or
prior criminal experience. 92 It also found that age was related to Mir-
anda comprehension at ages ten through fourteen, beyond which
scores were similar for fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds.' 93 The author
summarized that juveniles younger than fifteen manifested signifi-
cantly poorer comprehension than adults of comparable intelli-
gence. 94 His summary also included the finding that sixteen-year-olds
understood their rights as well as seventeen- to twenty-two-year-old
adults. '91
In testing the subjects' understanding of the function and signifi-
cance of the Miranda rights, the study revealed that:
* 28.6% of juveniles attributed friendly or apologetic feelings to the
police;
* 28% of juveniles assumed that lawyers owed a duty to the juvenile
court that interfered with the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship;
* 61.8% of juveniles did not know that a judge cannot penalize
someone for invoking the right to silence;
* 55.3% believed they would have to explain their criminal
involvement in court if questioned by a judge.'9
187. Id. at 1144-47.
188. Id. at 1151-52.
189. Id. at 1153.
190. Id. at 1153-54.
191. Id. at 1154.
192. Id. at 1155.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1157.
195. Id. at 1160.
196. Id. at 1157-59.
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Grisso concluded that in light of these results, waivers made by ju-
veniles under age fifteen cannot be considered meaningful."" He
stated: "[T]he project findings are bolstered by the fact that while the
research subjects were questioned under optimal circumstances, juven-
iles actually interrogated by the police would not be immune from
comprehension inhibitions that stem from a pressure-packed set-
ting.' 198
Lastly, Grisso analyzed four options for structuring a per se exclu-
sionary rule and concluded that "the requirement that counsel be
present affords the best protection for juveniles under the age of fif-
teen." 99 He asserts that giving young juveniles a nonwaivable right to
counsel is a "feasible and effective" means of protection, and that an
attorney would "assist the youth in asserting his rights and would help
to ensure that a waiver or confession, if made, is voluntary and know-
ing." 2 0 Grisso also proposes a per se exclusionary rule for older ju-
veniles based on extrinsic considerations.20' He points to the fact that
many fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds, particularly those with a low IQ
score, showed no better comprehension than the younger juveniles,
and that the study didn't measure juveniles' abilities to waive their
rights with the added pressure of an actual interrogation setting. 202
E. Recommendations for a Rule that Prohibits Waiver
At least two organizations that have spent a considerable amount of
time researching juvenile rights have recommended that a juvenile not
be permitted to waive the right to counsel during interrogation. The
President's Crime Commission recommended that to assure proce-
dural justice, "Counsel should be appointed as a matter of course
wherever coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any affir-
mative choice by child or parent."20
The Institute of Judicial Administration and American Bar Associa-
tion Juvenile Justice Standards Project has recommended that, "[in
delinquency cases, the juvenile should have the effective assistance of
counsel at all stages of the proceeding," and that this right to counsel
should be mandatory and nonwaivable.3
197. Id. at 1161.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1161-62.
200. Id. at 1163.
201. Id. at 1164.
202. Id. at 1164-65.
203. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38 n.65 (1967) (quoting Nat'l Crime Comm'n Report 86-87).
204. Standard 5.1, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS (1980).
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Barry C. Feld, a commentator who writes extensively on juvenile
rights, also recommends making the right to counsel and to silence
nonwaivable. 05 While he does not specify a specific age group that
would be covered by his rule, he would require "consultation with
counsel and the presence of an attorney at every interrogation of a
juvenile and prior to any waiver of the right to counsel. ' 2 06
V. CONCLUSION
Florida faces a juvenile crime crisis. It is a crisis that is being con-
fronted by every branch of government, in the legislature, in executive
agencies, and in the courtrooms of this state. Although Florida spends
$241 million on juvenile justice programs annually, 0 7 its juvenile jus-
tice system has been in constant flux, being reorganized three times in
as many years.2°8 In striving to reform this crumbling system, legisla-
tors and other policy-making groups must first make a commitment to
protecting children's constitutional rights. As previously mentioned, if
the system does not respect juveniles, they will not respect the system.
Although it seems that nearly everyone agrees on a certain level that
minors should be treated different from adults, this has not translated
into special protection in the custodial interrogation arena. Although
the Legislature has granted specific protections to children not availa-
ble to adults and has withheld certain privileges from children until
they attain a specified age, 2°9 it has not seen fit to mandate that chil-
dren being questioned by police regarding their involvement in crimi-
nal activity receive special protection. In formulating a solution, we
must ask ourselves: Why is a child of any age treated exactly as an
adult in the pressure-packed and potentially life-changing setting of a
police interrogation room?
Proponents of the totality of the circumstances approach would ar-
gue that it adequately protects the juvenile by taking his or her age
and IQ into account in determining whether his or her statement is
admissible. This approach, however, only protects the juvenile after
he or she has confessed to the police; it doesnothing to help the juve-
nile make the decision confronting him or her in the interrogation
room. Proponents would further argue that the totality test is neces-
sary because some juveniles are hardened criminals that thoroughly
understand the system and possess the capacity to knowingly and vol-
205. Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 10, at 184-90.
206. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
207. Kleindienst & Hirth, supra note 16.
208. Kleindienst & Hirth, supra note 19.
209. See supra note 99.
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untarily waive their rights. Although the flexibility of the totality ap-
proach works well in theory, it has proven to be unworkable in
practice. The totality approach gives law enforcement little guidance
in evaluating a juvenile's waiver and, as Judge Farmer expressed in
W.M. v. State,210 its subjective nature gives courts virtually unfettered
discretion in ruling on a juvenile's statement.
Accepting the premise then, that the totality approach is unworka-
ble in practice, what approach should Florida adopt? In formulating a
new rule, common sense dictates that, at the very least, a young
child's parent should be given the opportunity to be present through-
out the questioning. Most parents would be appalled to learn that
their child could be arrested, taken into custody, given the Miranda
rights, and after waiving those rights, interrogated for hours,2 1 l all
without their knowledge, and more importantly, without their advice.
Because there are valid arguments against the presence of a parent, ' 1 2
however, it may be desirable to relax this requirement for older juven-
iles for whom parental authority is generally more relaxed.
The approach adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
seems to fairly embody both of these concepts.2 13 That rule provides
that in order for the court to find a juvenile's waiver knowing and
intelligent, the juvenile must have consulted with a parent or other
interested adult who was present during the questioning and under-
stood the juvenile's Miranda warnings. The exclusionary rule is re-
laxed, however, if the child is fourteen or over and if it can be shown
that "the circumstances . . . demonstrate a high degree of intelligence,
210. W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA) (Farmer, J., dissenting), review denied,
593 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1991).
211. Although section 39.037(2), Florida Statutes, requires that a child's parents be notified
anytime the child is taken into custody, it does not prohibit the police from interrogating the
child before the parent arrives. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
212. A rule that requires parental presence before allowing a juvenile to waive his rights gives
rise to several problems, many of which concern the ability of laypeople to provide effective
assistance. Many parents do not care, and often are "only equal in capacity to, the child and
therefore poorly equipped to comprehend the complexities confronting them." Grisso, supra,
note 186 at 1163 (quoting Theodore McMillian & Dorothy L. McMurty, The Role of the Defense
Lawyer in the Juvenile Court: Advocate or Social Worker? 14 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561, 570
(1969)). Further, the child and his or her parent(s) may have conflicting interests or the emo-
tional reaction of the parent(s) to the child's detention may render the parent(s) unable to pro-
vide the child with the type of support and counsel he or she needs. Jan Kirby Byland,
Comment, Louisiana Children's Code Article 808: A Positive Step on Behalf of Louisiana's
Children, 52 LA. L. REv. 1141, 1155 (1992). In a survey of middle-class parents of adolescents,
Professor Grisso found that about one-third would advise their children to confess to police, and
about one-half said that youth should remain silent temporarily until things "cool down."
THOMtAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 180-82
(1981).
213. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the juve-
nile. ' ' 2t4 In adopting this approach, however, Florida should extend
the parental presence requirement to include fourteen-year-olds in
light of Mr. Grisso's research. Thus, the rule would only be relaxed if
the juvenile was fifteen or over and the other factors were shown.2 5
The Massachusetts approach has many advantages. First, it forces
the parents of younger children to get involved. Although requiring
the presence of a parent has some disadvantages, 26 its advantages out-
weigh them, especially at the younger years. The presence of a parent
at a custodial interrogation is helpful in:
mitigating the dangers of untrustworthiness, reducing coercive
influences, providing an independent witness who can testify in court
as to any coercion that was present, assuring the accuracy of any
statements obtained, and relieving police of the burden of making
subjective judgments on a case-by-case basis about the competency
of the youths they are questioning. 217
Further, forcing a parent to be present at the police station with his or
her child is valuable in itself. It may give an uninterested parent the
incentive to expend more effort to keep his or her child out of trouble,
in addition to informing the parent of his or her child's actions and
their ramifications.
A per se rule has the advantage of providing clear boundaries, but it
does not take into account the individual characteristics of the child.
The second part of Massachusett's approach provides this flexibility.
It allows a court to look at an older juvenile's intelligence, experience,
knowledge, or sophistication in determining whether his or her state-
ment obtained as a result of a waiver should be admissible. Although
this rule has the disadvantage of requiring the courts to determine
whether a juvenile demonstrated sufficient intelligence, experience,
knowledge or sophistication to allow the police to bypass the parental
presence rule, it seems to embody a balance that should be acceptable
to both juveniles and law enforcement.
Applying this rule to the stories that introduced this Comment, the
police would have been forced to include a parent or other interested
adult in their interrogation of the boy called "Man." Although he
would have demonstrated sufficient experience with the justice system
214. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983).
215. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (study found that juveniles younger than
fifteen manifested significantly poorer comprehension than adults of comparable intelligence).
216. See supra note 212.
217. Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 10, at 178.
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for his statement to be admitted without the presence of a parent at
interrogation had he been over fourteen, his age (thirteen) would have
automatically prompted a call to his parent or guardian. Briana's case
would also have required a call to her parents. Although Briana was
over fourteen, the police could probably not demonstrate that she
possessed a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or so-
phistication as she had no criminal record or experience with the po-
lice. In these situations, the new rule would overprotect "Man," but
would give Briana the additional protection she probably needs.
Although this may not be a perfect solution, the Massachusetts ap-
proach would be a solid step forward toward protecting juveniles'
constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel,
and it could be an integral part of an overall revision of Florida's
juvenile justice system.
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